

Maoism in Bihar- A Discourse on the Role of Actors and a ‘Conducive’ Socio-Political Atmosphere

Suparna Banerjee

Junior Researcher

Zentrum für Entwicklungsforschung (Centre for Development Research)

University of Bonn, Bonn, Germany

2017 marked the 50th anniversary of a long standing political conflict in India- Maoism. Its continuation points not only to the failure of the approaches adopted by the Government but also to the support rendered to the Maoists by the rural and Adivasi population of central India. Mobilization of masses has many a times pushed the Maoists to venture into unknown terrain where it had to engage even at the cost of their much revered ideology. This paper argues, how, at the backdrop of rising Maoist presence, conducive socio-political atmosphere was created for not only the movement to originate but also to continue unabated for long time. It also attempts to critically study the role and contribution of various actors towards such an atmosphere which propagated the current crisis.

Keywords: *Maoism, ideology, mobilization, actors, socio-political*

Introduction: The year 2017 was symbolic as it marked the 50th anniversary of a long standing political movement in India. The terminology of the conflict has undergone variations marking relevance in different phases. In the initial years it was known as *Naxalism*, from the place *Naxalbari*, in the Siliguri subdivision of West Bengal from where the uprising originated. It occurred under the militant leadership of Charu Mazumder in 1967. Later, the members of the uprising formed a political party, Communist Party of India (Marxist- Leninist) (CPI (ML)).¹ In the subsequent years the movement broke down into different factions such as Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and Communist Party of India (Party Unity). However, a name by which it is popularly identified¹ especially in the media and the public sphere is Maoism or *Naxalism*. A reason behind this latest terminology is the coming together of different Maoist factions, mainly CPI-ML(People's War) and MCC, and forming a unified political front called Communist Party of India (Maoist) in the year 2004.²

Maoism is currently operational in 10 states and 106 districts of India,³ although the intensity of the conflict is different in various states. For example, the state of Chattisgarh is the worst affected with Maoist activities, but Maharashtra witnesses lower presence of Maoists in selected districts. The Government of India (GOI) has classified it as the LeftWing Extremism (LWE) and a division in the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) is dedicated exclusively to oversee the policy implementation towards managing the conflict.

The larger goal of the Maoists is violent overthrow of the elected government and establish classless society through revolution.⁴ In order to achieve the goal their modus operandi of mass mobilisation largely depends upon the local issues which varies from different states. These issues range from land disputes to caste wars, dislocation of population to workers' agitation. It is common to observe conflict between the government forces and the Maoists over these contested issues. What is unique in areas like Bihar is when a third party enters the arena of conflict, which in this case is the rise of private militias or the *Senas* and their close association with the dominant sections of the society mainly the upper castes and the political elites. Over the period all of these actors-Maoists, *Senas* and public representatives-end up fighting over short sighted agendas, like caste revenge or electoral victory and decades of violence.

Significance of Case Study: Bihar

The study in Bihar is significant for several reasons. Firstly, the movement originated in Bihar almost at the same time when *Naxalbari* happened i.e., 1967. Secondly, the state is largely depended upon agrarian economy which allows for feudal relations between the landowners and the tillers of the soil to exist. The presence of this relation provided ample scope for exploitation and antagonism between the land owners and the peasants. Finally, the universal acceptance of caste as an important social category divides the population in a perpetual state of inequality and neglect.

The dual functionality of the socio-economic categories of caste and class within a semi-feudal, agrarian non-industrialised society easily aggravates a social unrest and transforms it into conflict. The population of the state gets grouped together into one or the other categories and in the presence of an imminent and ongoing conflict it is almost impossible to remain neutral without choosing sides. The actors within these categories share a dyadic relation- upper caste powerful landlord class vis-à-vis lower caste powerless peasant class. A person by virtue of its membership in the second category suffers from multi-layered exploitation-caste and class-by the members of the first category. This unique scenario provided greater opportunity for the Maoists to enhance their presence in the state by catering to the demands of the population variously affected by these three different socio-economic factors.

The origin: The Press Information Bureau of India lists 22 districts of Bihar⁵ out of a total 38 districts⁶ which have Maoists presence. The statistics show that more than 50% of the geographical terrain in the state is under the control of the Maoists although the degree of violence and the extent of influence, varies among different districts. Central Bihar was at the forefront of the Maoists activities since the beginning of the upsurge- with Patna, Gaya, Jehanabad, Nalanda, Bhojpur, Aurangabad, and Nawadh being the worst affected.⁷

“The peasant resurgence in the district (Bhojpur) came after the national dismemberment of the CPI (M-L) and a near-total recantation of the 'annihilation line'-of Charu Mazumdar. In the case of Bihar, the movement was launched in the second phase, after the death of Rajkishore in Musahari, the arrest and detention of the Amalendu Sen-

*Kalyan Roy-Mary Tyler group in the Ruam jungles and extinction of the Suraigarha rebels, with all the precedents of naxalism almost dead.*⁸

Over the period the movement got embroiled into caste wars, organised crime, local politics and fratricidal infighting. This paper will try and analyse the role of the various actors whose actions and motivations contributed to the sustenance of social unrest in Bihar. It will also attempt to explain the prevailing social conditions which formed the structure where the actors enacted their roles and which facilitated for such unrest to survive and continue for a long period.

“Achilles Heels” – Caste and Politics

Caste and its complex and myriad manifestations has often influenced the socio-political undercurrents of the state. “Caste is the most durable mode of social identity and has become the basis of socio-political organisations.”⁹ The fight between the upper and lower caste was not an attempt by the latter to move along the upper echelons of the social hierarchy but of dignity (izzat). A systemic understanding and institutionalisation of caste inspired actions beyond morality and human dignity.

“...the pride of Bhumihars, whose unwritten law prohibits lower castes to remain seated in their presence even at their own doorstep; its viewing even the wearing of a clean dhoti or receiving education as intolerable arrogance; the ‘hakim’ suffix after every sentence; at places the taking of dole, i.e, the Bhumihar or Raiput landlord's privilege to sleep with the new bride of a lower caste labourer on the wedding night”¹⁰

The above quote speaks volume about the entrenchment of caste division and the immorality that accompanies it. Up until the implementation of the Mandal Commission¹¹ report, the acknowledgement of caste in India was confined to the social sphere as an identity which further controlled other aspects of human existence like work allocation, and dignity. The politicisation of caste received a vigour with the provisions and recommendations of the Mandal commission report. It is pertinent to state at this point that the implementation of the provisions of the Mandal Commission brought the issue of caste-based sub nationalism to the forefront of identity politics in the Indian political setting.¹² However, much before that, in Bihar, the then Chief Minister (CM), Karpoori Thakur implemented the provisions of the “Mungeri Lal Commission (1975) introducing a 3% separate quota for OBC women, 18% for MBCs and 13% for the slightly advanced BCs.”¹³

The caste structure in Bihar pertains to Forward and backward castes which are further subdivided into other castes groups. The forward castes in Bihar comprises Brahmins, Bhumihars, Rajputs and Kayasthas and the backward castes comprises Yadavs, Koeris and Kurmis. Although numerically, Kayasthas are insignificant, their position in terms of political significance traces back to pre-independence period.¹⁴ Even though the backward castes are numerically significant, they have been politically forsaken for a very long time by the Indian National Congress (in short Congress) who relied heavily on the forward castes. Some of the most prominent leadership of the Party who belonged to the forward castes included Rajendra Prasad and Sachchidanand Sinha.¹⁵ The Congress also enjoyed the support of the Scheduled

Castes (ex-untouchables), for whom Mahatma Gandhi had unwavering empathy and whom he prefers to call as *Harijans*. He had persistently fought for their rights and dignity which eventually paved the way for many Constitutional provisions for their protection in the future¹⁶.

The backward castes, now known as Other Backward Class (OBC), gained political momentum with the guarantee of reservation in the Mandal Commission. Additionally, another factor which played a role in the rise of the backward castes, is the impact of Green Revolution on the agriculture, the gains from which have been reaped by a certain section of the Yadavs¹⁷. Yadavs constitute 11% and the combination of Koeris and Kurmis constitute 7.7 % of the total population of Bihar¹⁸. Yadavs eventually rose higher up in the ladder in terms of attaining political significance since 1990's. However, the community has been subjected to social prejudice so far so that, "the very mention of the Community invokes in Bihar, dull, miserly, and loud-mouthed people lacking in grace and culture."¹⁹ As Mandal Commission paved the way for caste consciousness and the right to resources and entitlements, the caste dynamics began taking a different turn. Being numerically significant it was the Yadavs, a backward caste, whose support was suddenly in demand by various political parties to garner maximum electoral advantages. Alongside this, there has been a steady rise of regional political parties led by members of the backyard castes. Throughout the 1990's new faces of politics started emerging with Lalu Prasad Yadav, Nitish Kumar and Jai Prakash Yadav at the forefront^{20, 21}.

Caste considerations is an important element for elections in Bihar. Caste is a determinant factor for political constituency and sharing of power in the Bihar politics. Not only are social categories identifiable on the basis of caste identity but also distribution of resources and government entitlements are influenced and manipulated on the basis of caste superiority. For a very long time the decision making power in the state was in the hands of the upper castes. With the balance of power and bases tilting towards the backward caste, social unrest was a foregone conclusion. For the lower castes it was an opportunity long overdue to demand what has been denied to them for decades and for generations. Caste as a social category transcended to caste as a political category and allowed previously distant actors to become an integral part of the events that were to unfold in the coming decades.

Elephant in the Room- Land and Politics

Bihar has a feudal agrarian socio-economic relations. Excessively large land holdings and the lack of implementation of the land reforms acts have provided opportunity to amass huge acres of land by the land owning class.²² At this backdrop, the unfolding of various land reforms act and its complicated dynamics becomes coherent. For a considerable period of 1947-1967²³, the political reign of the state was in the control of Congress. As mentioned before, Congress enjoyed substantial vote banks from the higher castes and that acted as an impediment to successful land reforms which would have proved unfavourable to the land owners. Bihar had a patron-client voting system in which tenants and agricultural labourers voted at the behest of the landlords.²⁴ It is surprising to note here, that Bihar was one of the first states in India to abolish Zamindari system mainly due to the degrading impact of Colonial practices like Permanent settlement of 1793 and Bihar Tenancy Act of 1885 which had adversely affected the land relations of the state²⁵. Since the landlords were not deprived of their homestead and private lands which were quite large, the Land Ceiling Act was imposed in 1962 to seize excess land for

redistribution²⁶. In the long run, however, Bihar adopted a middle course to address the concerns of both the actors dealing with land- pacify the peasants and assure the landlords of the status quo, “it framed laws even as it showed the escape clauses to the landlords.”²⁷ Even as recent as during the Chief Ministership of Nitish Kumar, the government refused to implement the Bihar Land Reforms Commission (2006-08) recommendations constituted under D. Bandopadhyay²⁸. Mr. Bandopadhyay lists other reasons behind the recurrent underdevelopment of the state apart from weak land reforms- the inequality gap, the concentration of labour in the primary sector, lack of industrialisation, loss of resources after the bifurcation of the state and finally, lack of education. On the other hand, earlier, stating a contrarian view point, Jairam Ramesh, then secretary of the All India Congress Committee's (AICC) Economic Affairs Department stated that “Bihar's overall literacy rate in 1991 was 38.5 per cent, whereas that of Jehanabad and Nalanda was 46.4 per cent and 47 per cent respectively. Thus, in some ways the violence in central Bihar is not the offshoot of stagnation and poverty but is instead a reflection of development and growth, however stunted.”²⁹

The issue of land in Bihar attained agency with the caste and political elite attempting to maintain the status quo. The convergence of landed elite with the political class made it easier to not only prevent land reforms to be universally implemented but also crush any kind of agrarian movement to that effect. This became a sensitive issue which none of the political party – centre as well as the state- felt comfortable to address for the fear of losing electoral support of the dominant class.

Agrarian violence and social unrest: launch of the Maoist movement: In this ongoing dovetailing of land and caste, class attained a significant advantage. The economic condition of the middle peasantry – Yadavs, Koeris and Kurmis, improved significantly although the situation of a vast section of agricultural labourers and poor peasants remained unchanged³⁰. The space was wide open for groups with vested interests to manipulate the situational vulnerability in its favour. And this manipulation primarily depended upon three sets of actors- the upper castes (who were also the landlords), the middle peasantry (who were politically and socially handicapped and later improved their condition) and the agricultural labourers (who were in turn the lower castes). Absence of land distribution, higher levels of unemployment, and rising caste atrocities have long been creating a sense of resentment among the marginalised sections of the society. While they began to form peasant organisations to address their demands, the socio-political space was wide open for yet another actor, the Maoists to create their bases by mobilising these disenfranchised masses. It was these marginalised of the caste-class group who formed the support base of the various factions of the Maoist Party.

The phenomenon of the Private militias or *Senas*, the association of the agro-production functioning in the state with armed groups has a long history. The landlords regularly maintained an armed group called ‘*lathaiths*’, ‘whose job is to keep the peasants and the tenants in their place and to ensure taxes and rents are paid regularly.’³¹

The second category of the armed bands, known as the *Senas* or the private militias was more organised and more dreadful.³² The landowning class who were also the upper castes, by virtue of their financial and social superiority began to raise individual private armies and arm them with

weaponry. For example, Kuer *Sena* and Sunlight *Sena* were formed by the Rajputs, the Bhumihars formed Brahmarshi *Sena*.

Among all the existing private militias, Ranveer *Sena* gained notoriety for its dreadful massacres and connivance with local politics. It has its members drawn mostly from criminal youth mostly belonging to Bhumihars and Rajput landowning class.³³ Although it is officially banned, it entered into election in 1999 under the banner of its peasant front Rastravadi Kishan Mahasangha.³⁴ “The use of caste feeling to serve ‘class’ interest is apparent in the composition of the Ranveer *Sena*”³⁵. Two of the most horrific massacres in which the *Sena* was involved were Bathani Tola massacre in 1996 which killed 19 people mostly belonging to the extremely backward Muslim community and Dalits³⁶ and Laxmanpur Bathe massacre in 1997 which killed 58 Dalits.³⁷ It is however, surprising that even the backward castes were not far behind in forming their individual *Senas* –while the Bhoomi *Sena* was created under the guidance of Kurmis, the Lorik *Sena* was formed by the Yadavs of the Jehanabad district. Louis argues that the even Muslim Pathan landlords of Palamau, Garwah and Gaya aligned with the Rajput landlords and formed the Sunlight *Sena*.³⁸

With regard to the rise of the *Senas* two lines of arguments are put forward. Firstly, some argue that the *Senas* emerged as a result of the Naxalite violence in the state. The second line of argument stresses on the fact that the *Senas* were created in direct response to Green Revolution.³⁹ Although Green Revolution facilitated increase in agricultural surplus it failed to reduce the income inequalities between the classes. This led to growing dissatisfaction among the lower class which organized themselves into militant peasant organisations to demand for their rights from the landlords. The emergence of the Maoism in the state is the direct consequence of the increasing influence and violence perpetrated by these *Senas*.

During this time various private militias like the Sunlight *Sena*, Bhoomi *Sena* etc came up leading to a spiral of violence between the hired mercenaries and the peasants fighting for their rights. In the series of unfolding of events Maoists began to mobilize masses along these lines of caste and class exploitation. They provided moral and physical support to the advancement of the cause of the peasants. The *Senas*, on the other served a dual purpose- protect the lands from its forcible seizure in the wake of militant opposition from the peasants and contain the rise and spread of Naxalism in the state⁴⁰. Although, it failed in its second objective as “The proliferation of the *Senas*, however, failed to contain the spread and influence of the Naxalites”⁴¹

What began as a right based movement led by the victims of caste exploitation and poor peasants, gradually metamorphosed into ugly wars. The situation turned worse with every passing day as the landowners (who were also the upper caste) received unwavering support from the political class and launched scathing attack on the poor agricultural labourers (who were also the lower caste) demanding higher wages. The lower castes, in turn, received support from the Maoists. Over a period of time, the area, mainly the region of central Bihar, slipped under the dominance of Maoists where regular clashes became a common scenario. The clashes manifested a mix of both class and caste conflict. Eventually the Maoist movement in the state got embroiled in the local politics dominated by caste and fratricidal fighting amongst its various factions.

However, a reductionist approach towards the conflict would be inadequate to explain the unfolding of events during the period. It was not only about the class or caste conflict in isolation. A closer look at the violence would clarify how the entire system of social, political and economic variables of the state contributed towards the sustenance of violence for more than a decade with the plethora of Maoists groups simultaneously contributing to this spiral of violence.

The spiral of violence- Senas, Maoists and the Government

The infighting among the various Maoist groups in Bihar led to its division mainly into 3 sub-groups- CPI (M-L) Liberation, MCC, and CPI (M-L) Party Unity. Liberation parted ways in 1977 and organised mass movements through *Kisan Sabhas* (Peasant Organisations) instead of the violent lines pursued by the other two groups. Later in 1989 it participated in Parliamentary elections through a front organisation called Indian People's Front (IPF). MCC and Party Unity became banned underground organisations as it decided to pursue party lines of annihilation of class enemies. Thus, began a series of attacks and counter attacks between the Maoists and the *Senas* whose victims were people from both the lower and the upper castes and class. On one hand, the *Senas* targeted the Dalits and other lower castes, on the other hand the Maoists parties directed their attacks on the Rajputs and the Bhumihars.

The sporadic clashes and the associated killings, over the period, transformed into organised violence and counter vengeance among the dominant and the dominated. For instance, the Arwal massacre in April 1986 led to the killings of 24 peasants and the Laxmanpur Bathe massacre in 1996 spearheaded by Ranvir Sena killed 61 Dalits.

Adversely, *"The MCC was responsible for the killing of at least fifty-four upper-caste Rajput community members in Dalelchak Baghaura in May 1987.....MCC was also responsible for slitting the throats of forty-four upper-caste farmers in Bara village on February 12, 1992. Thirty-six died on the spot, and one died in the hospital. The killings were reportedly in retaliation for the murders of ten MCC supporters by the Savarna Liberation Front, an upper-caste Bhumihar militia, two months earlier."*⁴²

However, not all killings involved these two actors- the Maoists and the *Senas*. There were inter factional fighting between the Party Unity and the MCC. Eventually, with the aim of gaining a foothold in the northern territory PWG merged with Party Unity in 1998 and the merged party came to be known as CPI (M-L)People's War.

It is important to observe the role played by the administration in this spiral of violence and how their response in handling the crisis actually fomented the violence for long. In one instance of caste violence in Khagaria where 16 people from upper backward castes, Koeris and Kurmis, were murdered, without any responsible judicial enquiry Bihar government under Nitish Kumar declared it as the handiwork of the Maoists. To add to this later it retracted from this theory to attribute it as the 'war of attrition between two groups of anti-socials.'⁴³ With the presence of the Maoists in the state, it became easy for the government to shift any administrative lapses onto them. This turned out to be a systematic approach adopted by the government to manage its antagonism with the Maoists. By blaming them for every crime committed in the state, the

government tried to create a distrust between the Maoists and their supporters or increase the animosity between them and their detractors. In addition to this, as a strategy to deal with the ongoing crisis, the government decided to openly arm able bodied people to deal with the violence perpetrated by the Maoists.

‘The evidence of this can be traced in a press note issued by the Deputy Inspector General of police (in charge of Naxalites) as reported on 28 May 1975 in a local newspaper: The Bihar government has decided to arm all able-bodied persons in Bhojpur and Patna districts for self-defence to face the extreme menace (read the Naxalites), who have recently launched an armed struggle... The district magistrates of both these districts have been asked to visit the affected villages and issue licences for firearms on the spot to those who were able to possess them...The decision was taken following aspart in the armed attackson landowners by the extremists in these villages. The trouble was mostly of agrarian nature.’⁴⁴

All three actors- the landlords by arming the *Senas*, the Maoists in support of the marginalized and the government-played its part in the sustenance of the violence in the rural areas of the state. The irony remains that every actor uses violence as a means to claim justice.

The Response of the State Government

Against a backdrop of continued social unrest and violence, the first coordinated police action began in 1985 which was known as “Operation Task Force” with the aim of targeting the six districts where the Naxalites had a strong presence⁴⁵ or as Association for Protection of Democratic Rights (APDR) has put, it to quell the tide of peasant unrest⁴⁶. In retaliation, the peasant organisations like Mazdoor Kisan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) and Bihar Provincial Kisan Sabha (BPKS) were organising the peasants to mobilise opinions. It was in one such gathering that the Arwal massacre happened. The Arwal massacre of 19 April 1986 in which 26 landless labourers were shot dead by the police was the direct result of this policy.⁴⁷

However, very soon the government realised the fallacy of security based state approaches to quell the violence perpetrated by various groups in the state. As a following step, it came up with a dual strategy of development and security under the names of Operation Siddharth and Operation Rakshak.

Operation Siddharth was funded by the Central Government providing a sum of Rs. 200 crores for the development of central Bihar, mainly the areas worst affected with violence.⁴⁸ The aim of this programmes was to raise the socioeconomic condition of the poor in three districts - Jehanabad, Gaya and Aurangabad.⁴⁹ It was the brain child of the then CM Bhagwat Jha Azad. It included a number of programmes, the first among which is the implementation of land reforms laws and distribution of *bhoodan* land among 25 blocks of Gaya, Aurangabad and Jehanabad districts. Secondly, in order to address the growing dissatisfaction among the labourers it aimed to implement the statutory minimum wage. And finally, to the marginal farmers the programme aimed at distributing fertilisers and seeds. A report of People’s Union for Democratic Rights (PUDR)⁵⁰, however, claims that the objective of this operation is to wean away the masses from

supporting the Naxalites and thus act as a counter strategy to check the spread of the Maoist activities in the state. Nevertheless, the programme attained only a fifth of its land distribution objectives with the police camps acting as additional sources of burden.

Operation Rakshak was another state response to address the ongoing crisis. Bihar Military Police with Central Reserve Police Force were deployed by the Central Government in seven districts of Bihar. The troops were stationed in various primary schools and health centres which proved to be a challenge for these institutions to function normally. This had sent a wrong message to the residents of the area whose normal lives have been severely affected and public services impossible to get. On the one hand while the security forces succeeded in arresting “862 extremists”⁵¹ and therefore was proving to be effective in terms of arresting the spread of the influence of the Maoists, the programme created a trust deficit between the people and the administration. Incessant violence on a regular scale and damage to life and property paved the way for the people in the areas to pick up sides- *Senas*, Government or the Maoists. In the process, all these actors began to gain popularity among the divided masses, which helped them to garner support and extend their area of influence.

The spread of Maoism in the state witnessed a coordinated approach between the Central and the state government which encompassed a combination of both development and security related measures. The state government received regular aid to address the problem of underdevelopment mainly in the central parts of Bihar. Along with that, the paramilitary forces supported the state police to curb the violence unleashed by the combination of caste, class and extremist elements. Thus, one may infer from this discussion that both the central and the state governments worked in tandem to handle the crisis, thereby proving that pragmatism as essence of policy making was sometimes the preferred mode of conducting governance in the state.

The Centre-State kinship and its multiple ramifications: In the last section the paper makes an attempt to explain that it is not only grass root political scenario that contributed to the growing social unrest but how actors , dominant and influential, in the form of political elites systematically created conducive atmosphere for the injustice and the unrest to originate and continue. Two important phenomenon are taken into consideration to analyze the above statement. One is the Jehanabad lobby and the other is Amir Das commission. The discussion on the following two aspects will help in analyzing the role and behaviors of actors in two different scenario. In the first case, a sub national identity and collective economic interests held the members of a group together which played a prominent role in the sustenance of superiority by dominant castes on the issue of land. Formation of armed bands and ineffective land reforms acts were the consequence of this superior identity to maintain the status quo and crush any resistance attempting to challenge it. In the second scenario, the actions of the involved actors were motivated by political power and electoral advantage. Absence of justice for the marginalized Dalits enhanced the influence and confidence of these armed groups which continued its meddling in the social unrest of these rural areas for a long time.

The Jehanabad Lobby: The vote banks of the Congress catered mostly to the Upper castes and the Dalits (explained earlier). The district of Jehanabad occupies a very important place in this discussion. Throughout the 70's and the 80's, a group of powerful Congress leaders represented the district mostly belonging to the Bhumihars community. In the 80's this group came to be known as the Jehanabad Lobby. The lobby was led by King Mahendra Prasad Singh whose

proximity to Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was well known⁵². One of the main founders of the Brahmarshi Sena was an independent MLA Sardar Krishna Singh, who was backed by the Jehanabad Lobby. This Sena, later became a prominent caste Sena around 85-86. Although following the Arwal massacre this, along with other Senas like Lorik, Bhoomi, Hari Sena and Lal Sena were banned by the Bindeshwari Dubey government⁵³. However, such a step had upset the 9 MLA's of the Jehanabad Lobby who had supported the government because of its softer stance on the Senas. One of the doubts raised with regard to the effective implementation of the development programmes under the codename Operation Siddhartha was because of the close association of the CM Bhagwat Jha Azad and this upper caste lobby.⁵⁴ Reportedly, the lobby was behind the transfer of Vyasji, who was the sub-divisional officer of Jehanabad, and had taken a firm stand against land disputes and the private armies⁵⁵.

Amir Das Commission: Amir Das Commission was constituted by the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) government to probe the alleged links between politicians and the members of Ranvir Sena.⁵⁶ It was constituted soon after the Laxmanpur Bathe incident in 1997 in which 56 Dalits had been killed⁵⁷. It was asked to submit its report within six months of coming into existence.

*'But it began its inquiry only in 1999 and since then had called a number of politicians, including former union ministers Murli Manohar Joshi, C P Thakur, former governor Kailashpati Mishra, BJP leader Sushil Kumar Modi and RJD's Union Minister Akhilesh Prasad Singh, former Jehanabad Member of Parliament (MP) Arun Kumar and RJD's then National Spokesman Shivanand Tiwari to depose their statement in reply to the queries on the accusations against them of links with the proscribed outfit before it. The Commission had also compiled the details of the allegations against the top RJD and BJP leaders levelled by the accused in their confessional statements which formed the basis for issuing summons to them to depose in person or through their lawyers.'*⁵⁸

In 2005 under the Nitish Kumar government the commission was disbanded and efforts to seek extension for a year was not welcomed. The Janata Dal (United) [JD (U)] was ruling Bihar at that point in time with the coalition partner Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Some of the London based Dalit organisations like Dalit Solidarity Network, Federation of Ambedkarite and Buddhist Organisation, UK, CasteWatchUK, Sri Guru Ravidass Global Organisation for Human Rights, and South Asia Solidarity Group had written an open letter to PM Narendra Modi demanding the recommissioning of the Amir Das Commission to complete the task of investigation into the death of the Dalits in the incident⁵⁹. Dalit Solidarity Network has mentioned that the Commission was disbanded under pressure from the coalition partner⁶⁰. Ironically when the entire debate on Amir Das commission was in continuance, Nitish Kumar had set up a commission called Bihar Rajya Savarna Ayog to identify the underprivileged and the marginalised sections from the Upper caste community.⁶¹

The discussion on the two political aspects pertaining to Bihar suggests that the hierarchy of systemic injustice originates from the top.

The relationship between the Central and the state government has been cordial throughout the first two decades of the independence. The Congress was in power at both the centre and the state. The first change happened in 1967 when Mahamaya Prasad Sinha of Jana Kranti Dal

became the CM. This change, however, was for a brief period of one year. Over the next decade, till the Janata Party under Karpooi Thakur came to power in 1977, there was yet another intermittent rule of Congress with Bihar coming under President's Rule in 1972 for a period of two months. After a short term of three years Janata Party had to pave the way for Congress once again which continued its rule till the Janata Dal under Lalu Prasad Yadav, of the backward caste came to power for the first time in 1990's challenging the dominance of upper caste in the state. Congress so far has failed to regain its lost influence in the state which is being ruled alternatively by Lalu Prasad Yadav and his wife Rabri Devi of the RJD and Nitish Kumar of JD (U) with a mix of coalition partners from time to time.

The same political party ruling at both the levels of government- centre and state- has its own share of advantages. The difference in approach towards an issue at hand gets lessened as the same set of party ideas dominates both the stages. Subsequently, policy implementation becomes a comparatively easier task. This is preferable, when the policy pertains to addressing a crisis like situation and requires immediate action, for instance, the present discussion of violence and the efforts to curb its impact on Bihar. And this holds true in both the scenario- same as well as different political parties at the centre and the state. Jehanabad lobby which was a powerful political subgroup, influenced decision making which affected policy implementation at the ground level. Enjoying the support of upper caste, it was a difficult task for the centre to confront the lobby which would have come at a cost of electorate loss. Similar line of arguments can be made in case of the commission where pressure of coalition politics enacted the lead role in relegating the task of doing justice.

Discussions: The objective of the state, no matter whichever political party has formed the government, is to ensure the safety and security of its people. And in this respect Bihar has adopted a two-pronged strategy of development and security to address the rising violence perpetrated by a combination of, ineffectual land policies, caste clashes, class conflicts, rising economic disparity and the growing influence of the Maoists. What Bihar is witnessing today can be attributed more to an organised crime than the clash of identities (based on castes) or that of ideologies (based on extremists' infightings or that between the *Senas* and the Maoists). Over the period, therefore, the electorate of Bihar have challenged the dominant status quo by voting Congress out of power (in 1967) and electing the backward castes, Yadavs (1990's) to power. This, apart from other analysis, also sends a powerful symbolic message of bringing a backward caste into power in a state where complex caste dynamics play a preeminent role in the formation of the government.

Caste politics has been an integral part of Bihar political scenario. This idea of sub nationalism and identity politics has influenced not only government formation by the different political parties with their own caste agendas, but also facilitated decision making and policy formulation over the years. From an economic standpoint, class structure of the society began transforming partly due to Green revolution, which in turn has predisposed the caste system to alter the political balance of the state. A proxy war began between the private armies formed by the upper castes and the Maoists who supported the lower castes and the landless. Somewhere the division between caste and class amalgamated and became an instrument used by the conflicting parties to deal with one another. Left with fewer options the masses began to take sides which compounded the conflict by augmenting the sphere of influence of these groups. Over the period,

this conflict metamorphosed into an organized crime where gang wars and with that mindless violence erupted at the cost of ideology and ideals promoted by the actors. Land distribution is closely linked to the upper caste dilemma where most of the land belonged to them and hence the political balance of the state gets greatly affected if any measure to that effect is implemented. It is the elephant in the room which every political elite is reluctant to address. Land distribution is still a far-fetched dream with Nitish Kumar in 2008 refusing to accept the recommendations of the land reforms commission set up under D. Bandopadhyay.

Although the Maoist uprising had begun with the ideological notion aiming to reform the question of land, it has lost the initial fervor by intermingling with the local politics that perpetuated a reign of terror. Especially in Bihar, the cadres have transformed themselves into yet another local goon readily available as mercenaries. There is no place for violence in a democratic environment. However, sometimes we experience a variation in this rule when groups such as private militias like the *Senas* in Bihar or *Salwa Judum* in Chhattisgarh sprung up with the pretext of countering anti-state movements like Maoism. Carrot and stick approach adopted by consecutive Central and the state governments to manage this conflict has gone a long way in bringing down the level of conflict, but at a serious cost of life, property, and absence of governance in areas rightfully under the Indian Sovereignty. The forefathers of the Constitution preferred the federal system of government to provide space for adequate division of responsibilities and checks and balance on the system. While it would be naïve to argue that they were not aware of the kind of political scenario that might emerge in the future challenging this very idea, it is best to accept that evolving from this challenge into a better system is our pragmatic responsibility.

Conclusion: Any kind of unrest has either of the following three characteristics present in it- social, economic and political. The resolution of an unrest becomes complex when all three features play a role and unfolds itself layer-wise eventually transforming into an insurmountable dilemma. The actors possessing these characteristics have their respective goals which compete amongst it to gain superiority. In the end one observes that it is ultimately the collective interests of the actors from all three aspects that come together and function, to maintain its status quo. Distribution of resources remains confined among the powerful and the dominant groups which prevents any circumstance that might result in sharing of those resources. And it is in these collective interests that a plethora of actors from different fields function in a society.

In the case of Bihar there are two broad sets of actors- the Maoists and the 'others'. While the members of the first category is quite clear, the members in the second represents a mixed batch of landlords, *Senas*, and public representatives (elected representatives and security personnel), in short the powerful and the dominant. The 'others' can be further sub-divided on the basis of their identity and goals. It includes social category mainly the castes divisions, the economic category, the class divisions (landlords and the landless class) and finally the political class. Although the goals of these identities based categories vary- caste superiority, class dominance and political supremacy- there is a common thread which binds these members together. And that thread is the reluctance to share their superior status. Consequently, the members form a cohort on the basis of this mutual interest.

On the other hand, Maoists for the realization of their political goal of revolution need to mobilize masses as a preliminary step. Any kind of mobilization require an agenda or an issue

for the masses to rally behind them, something that acts as a binding force- for example communal riots require religious injustice by one group, terrorism mobilizes on the basis of a futuristic desired political space, #Metoo campaign needed ordinary as well as powerful women to campaign for the sexual abuses confronted by them from powerful people. For the Maoists, to achieve the broader goal of political revolution, involvement in a combination of local issues helps them garner the necessary support. In the case of Bihar, clashes originated between the upper and the lower castes which were also the landlord and the peasant classes respectively. Although the Maoists began their activities in support of the downtrodden and the marginalized who were being exploited by the upper castes and class, it soon turned into an ugly gang war between them and the *Senas*, in turn, supported by the powerful and the dominant groups.

In a way Bihar as a case study provides an ideal ground for any social scientist to study the melting pot of the economic and social impact of colonialism, dynamics of caste system and the rise of caste consciousness which dovetails with identity politics, the changing nature of class and its actors, the role of private militias within a democratic system and lastly, the experiment of the various Maoists groups with their adopted path of ideology (Parliamentary system of the Liberation and the violent lines of the MCC or the Party Unity).

Any social unrest occurs within a social structure which defines the nature and scope of the unrest. Bihar with its rural, semi feudal agrarian set-up produced a conducive atmosphere for the unrest to thrive for a long period. With the involvement of the actors and their respective interests the unrest metamorphosed into never ending conflict.

¹Das, Kartick., 'NAXALBARI TO TODAY'S MAOIST: Uprisings and Implications', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (APR. - JUNE, 2010), Pp. 489- 490, 492-495

²D. Gupta, Tilak., 'Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 29 (Jul. 22-28, 2006), pp. 3172-3176

³ Left Wing Extremism affected Districts., *Press Information Bureau* , Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=136706> retrieved on May 3, 2018

⁴D. Gupta., *Op.cit.*, p. 317

⁵ Press information Bureau, Ministry of Home affairs, Government of India

<http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=136706> Accessed on August 1, 2017

⁶ Districts of Bihar, Government of India, <http://gov.bih.nic.in/Profile/Districts.htm> Accessed on August 1, 2017

⁷ Bhatia, Bela., 'Naxalite movement in central Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 40, No. 15 (Apr. 9-15, 2005), pp. 1536-1549

⁸ Mukherjee, Kalyan., 'Peasant Revolt in Bhojpur', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 14, No. 36 (Sep. 8, 1979), p. 1536

⁹ Kumar, Sanjay, Sanjeer Alam, Mohammad, & Joshi, Dhananjai 'Caste Dynamics and Political Process In Bihar', *Journal of Indian School of Political Economy*, Jan-Jun, 2008, <http://www.ispepune.org.in/jis108pdf/Bihar.pdf> Accessed on August 14, 2017, p.2

¹⁰Mukherjee., *Op cit.*, p. 1537

¹¹Mandal commission was formed by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai. Headed by parliamentarian B.P. Mandal, it was tasked to consider the question of caste based reservations and thereby redress caste discrimination.

¹²Puri, Balraj, 'An Ideological Perspective on Mandal Report', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 25, No. 42/43 (Oct. 20-27, 1990), pp. 2352-2353

- ¹³ Fazal, Tanweer, 'The Unfinished Agenda of Social Justice', *Economic and Political Weekly*, August 2017, <http://www.epw.in/journal/2017/33/commentary/unfinished-agenda-social-justice.html> Accessed on August 5, 2017
- ¹⁴ Verma, Ravindra Kumar, 'Caste and Bihar Politics', *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 4, 1991, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41498247> Accessed on August 24, 2017 p 1142
- ¹⁵ Ibid., p 1142
- ¹⁶ Kumar, Alam& Joshi, *Op.cit.* p 5
- ¹⁷ D. Gupta, Tilak, 'Yadav Ascendancy in Bihar Politics' *Economic and Political Weekly*, Jun 27, 1992, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4398537> Accessed on August 9, 2017, p1305
- ¹⁸ Kumar, Alam& Joshi, *op.cit.* p 3
- ¹⁹ Gupta, *op.cit.* p 1304
- ²⁰ Verma, *op.cit.* p 1143
- ²¹ Kumar, Sanjay, 'New Phase in backward Caste Politics in Bihar: Janata Dal on the decline', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 34/35 (Aug. 21 - Sep. 3, 1999), pp.2472-2480
- ²² Prasad, Pradhan H, 'Agrarian violence in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22, No. 22 (May 30, 1987), p. 848
- ²³ The period of pre-independence is not covered in this article
- ²⁴ Kumar, Alam& Joshi, *op.cit.*, p 6
- ²⁵ Chitnu & Kumar, Ashutosh, 'Why Land Reforms Remained an Unfinished Task in Bihar', *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, June, 2017 <http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2022%20Issue6/Version-7/N2206079199.pdf> Accessed on August 6, 2017, p 92
- ²⁶ Ibid., p 92
- ²⁷ Sinha, Arun, 'Legal Loopholes: To Landlord' rescue', *Economic and Political Weekly*, October 21, 1978, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4367034> Accessed on August 6, 2017 p. 1758
- ²⁸ Bandyopadhyay, D, 'Lost opportunity in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, November 2009, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663804> Accessed on July 29, 2017
- ²⁹ Ramesh, Jairam, "No swarg out there but certainly lots of swar and swabhimaan' *India Today*, 12th April, 1999
- ³⁰ Chintu& Kumar *op.cit.*, p. 92
- ³¹ Louis, Prakash, 'Class war spreads to new areas', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 35, No. 26 (Jun. 24-30, 2000), pp. 2207
- ³² Das, Arvind N., 'Landowners' Armies Take over 'Law and Order' ', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan. 4, 1986), p. 15
- ³³ Sinha, Arvind & Sinha, Indu, 'Ranveer Sena and 'Massacre Widows', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 43 (Oct. 27 - Nov. 2, 2001), pp. 4095
- ³⁴ Ibid., p 4095
- ³⁵ Sinha, Arvind & Sinha, Indu, 'State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus: Bathani Tola Massacre', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 31, No. 44 (Nov. 2, 1996), p. 2908
- ³⁶ Ibid., 2908-2912
- ³⁷ Bhatia, Bela, 'Massacre on the Banks of the Sone', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 32, No. 51 (Dec. 20-26, 1997), pp. 3242-3245
- ³⁸ Louis, *Op cit.*, p. 2208
- ³⁹ Louis, *Op cit.*, p. 2207
- ⁴⁰ Human Rights Watch & Smita Narula, *Broken People: Caste violence against India's "untouchables"* (New Delhi: Human Rights Watch, 1999) p 48
- ⁴¹ Mathew, Mammen "Caste, Politics and the cycle of strife", <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume2/Fault2-MatthewF.htm> Accessed on July 20, 2017
- ⁴² "The Pattern of Abuse: Rural Violence In Bihar And The State's Response" Human Rights Watch <https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/India994-06.htm> Accessed on August 15, 2017
- ⁴³ Kumar, Avinash, 'Fallacy of the State in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 47, No. 44 (NOVEMBER 3, 2012), p. 23

- ⁴⁴Kumar, Avinash, 'Illegitimacy of the state in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 44, No. 44 (OCTOBER 31-NOVEMBER 6, 2009), p. 8
- ⁴⁵Nicholas Jaoul, "Naxalism in Bihar: From Bullet to Ballot" in Laurent Gayer & Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia- Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*(London: C.Hurst& Co., 2009) p 28
- ⁴⁶Arwal Massacre: A Government Conspiracy? Report of an Investigation, *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 31, 1986 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4375729> Accessed on July 30, 2017
- ⁴⁷Kunnath, George J. "Rebels From the Mud Houses: Dalits and the Making of the Maoist Revolution- Dalits and the making of Maoist Revolution in Bihar" (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2012)p 174
- ⁴⁸Ramesh, op.cit. *India Today*
- ⁴⁹Enlightened Scheme, India Today <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/operation-siddhartha-is-no-blood-and-thunder-army-exercise-intended-to-destroy-a-terrorist-group/1/330195.html> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁵⁰Cited in Kunnath, George J. "Rebels From the Mud Houses: Dalits and the Making of the Maoist Revolution- Dalits and the making of Maoist Revolution in Bihar" (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2012) p 174
- ⁵¹Ibid., p 175
- ⁵²Ahmed, Saroor, 'Why is Jehanabad the centre of bloodbaths?', *Rediff* <http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/apr/26bihar.htm> Accessed on August 20, 2017
- ⁵³Ahmed, Farzand 'Panic Ban' *India Today*, <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cm-bindeshwari-dubey-decision-to-ban-mkss-raises-doubts-about-his-grip-on-bihar/1/348808.html> Accessed on August 10, 2017
- ⁵⁴Enlightened Scheme, India Today <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/operation-siddhartha-is-no-blood-and-thunder-army-exercise-intended-to-destroy-a-terrorist-group/1/330195.html> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁵⁵Ahmed, Farzand, 'Transfer Tremors'<http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bihar-govt-transfers-ias-ips-officers-as-ruling-party-politicians-find-them-a-nuisance/1/348638.html> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁵⁶"Amir Das Commission disbanded", *Outlook*, <https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/amir-das-commission-probing-politician-sena-nexus-disbanded/376576> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁵⁷Suroor, Hasaan, 'Partners in crime: How Bihar politicians hushed up a Dalit massacre' *First Post*,<http://www.firstpost.com/politics/partners-in-crime-how-bihar-politicians-hushed-up-a-dalit-massacre-2410222.html> Accessed on August 11, 2017
- ⁵⁸Cited in Notes Kumar, Avinash, 'Fallacy of the State in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 47, No. 44 (NOVEMBER 3, 2012), p. 25
- ⁵⁹South Asia Solidarity Group Condemns the Burning Alive of Dalit Children in India, *South Asia Solidarity Group*, <http://www.southasiasolidarity.org/tag/dalit/page/4/> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁶⁰Verma, Meena, 'Prior to the visit to the UK of the Indian PM Modi, Dalit organisations sent him an open letter', *Dalit Solidarity Network, UK*, November 18, 2015 <http://dsnuk.org/2015/11/18/prior-to-the-visit-to-the-uk-of-the-indian-pm-modi-dalit-organisations-sent-him-an-open-letter/> Accessed on August 1, 2017
- ⁶¹Governing caste and Managing conflicts 1990-2011, *Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group* March, 2012, p 22 <http://www.mcrg.ac.in/PP48.pdf> Accessed on August 25, 2017
- ⁶²Das, Kartick., 'NAXALBARI TO TODAY'S MAOIST: Uprisings and Implications', *The Indian Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 71, No. 2 (APR. - JUNE, 2010), Pp. 489- 490, 492-495
- ⁶²D.Gupta, Tilak., 'Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 41, No. 29 (Jul. 22-28, 2006), pp. 3172-3176
- ⁶²Left Wing Extremism affected Districts., *Press Information Bureau*, Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India, <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=136706> retrieved on May 3, 2018
- ⁶²D. Gupta., *Op.cit.*, p. 317
- ⁶²Press information Bureau, Ministry of Home affairs, Government of India <http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=136706> Accessed on August 1, 2017
- ⁶²Districts of Bihar, Government of India, <http://gov.bih.nic.in/Profile/Districts.htm> Accessed on August 1, 2017
- ⁶²Bhatia, Bela., 'Naxalite movement in central Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 40, No. 15 (Apr. 9-15, 2005), pp. 1536-1549
- ⁶²Mukherjee, Kalyan., 'Peasant Revolt in Bhojpur', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 14, No. 36 (Sep. 8, 1979), p. 1536

- ⁶² Kumar, Sanjay, Sanjeer Alam, Mohammad, & Joshi, Dhananjai 'Caste Dynamics and Political Process In Bihar', *Journal of Indian School of Political Economy*, Jan-Jun, 2008, <http://www.ispepune.org.in/jis108pdf/Bihar.pdf> Accessed on August 14, 2017, p.2
- ⁶² Mukherjee., *Op cit.*, p. 1537
- ⁶² Mandal commission was formed by the Janata Party government under Prime Minister Morarji Desai. Headed by parliamentarian B.P. Mandal, it was tasked to consider the question of caste based reservations and thereby redress caste discrimination.
- ⁶² Puri, Balraj, 'An Ideological Perspective on Mandal Report', *Economic and Political Weekly* Vol. 25, No. 42/43 (Oct. 20-27, 1990), pp. 2352-2353
- ⁶² Fazal, Tanweer, 'The Unfinished Agenda of Social Justice', *Economic and Political Weekly*, August 2017, <http://www.epw.in/journal/2017/33/commentary/unfinished-agenda-social-justice.html> Accessed on August 5, 2017
- ⁶² Verma, Ravindra Kumar, 'Caste and Bihar Politics', *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 4, 1991, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41498247> Accessed on August 24, 2017 p 1142
- ⁶² Ibid., p 1142
- ⁶² Kumar, Alam & Joshi, *op.cit.*, p 5
- ⁶² D. Gupta, Tilak, 'Yadav Ascendancy in Bihar Politics' *Economic and Political Weekly*, Jun 27, 1992, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4398537> Accessed on August 9, 2017, p1305
- ⁶² Kumar, Alam & Joshi, *op.cit.*, p 3
- ⁶² Gupta, *op.cit.*, p 1304
- ⁶² Verma, *op.cit.*, p 1143
- ⁶² Kumar, Sanjay, 'New Phase in backward Caste Politics in Bihar: Janat Dal on the decline', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 34, No. 34/35 (Aug. 21 - Sep. 3, 1999), pp.2472-2480
- ⁶² Prasad, Pradhan H, 'Agrarian violence in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 22, No. 22 (May 30, 1987), p. 848
- ⁶² The period of pre-independence is not covered in this article
- ⁶² Kumar, Alam & Joshi, *op.cit.*, p 6
- ⁶² Chitnu & Kumar, Ashutosh, 'Why Land Reforms Remained an Unfinished Task in Bihar', *IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences*, June, 2017 <http://www.iosrjournals.org/iosr-jhss/papers/Vol.%2022%20Issue6/Version-7/N2206079199.pdf> Accessed on August 6, 2017, p 92
- ⁶² Ibid., p 92
- ⁶² Sinha, Arun, 'Legal Loopholes: To Landlord' rescue', *Economic and Political Weekly*, October 21, 1978, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4367034> Accessed on August 6, 2017 p. 1758
- ⁶² Bandyopadhyay, D, 'Lost opportunity in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, November 2009, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25663804> Accessed on July 29, 2017
- ⁶² Ramesh, Jairam, "No swarg out there but certainly lots of swar and swabhimaan" *India Today*, 12th April, 1999
- ⁶² Chintu & Kumar *op.cit.*, p. 92
- ⁶² Louis, Prakash, 'Class war spreads to new areas', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 35, No. 26 (Jun. 24-30, 2000), pp. 2207
- ⁶² Das, Arvind N., 'Landowners' Armies Take over 'Law and Order' ', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Jan. 4, 1986), p. 15
- ⁶² Sinha, Arvind & Sinha, Indu, 'Ranveer Sena and 'Massacre Widows', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 36, No. 43 (Oct. 27 - Nov. 2, 2001), pp. 4095
- ⁶² Ibid., p 4095
- ⁶² Sinha, Arvind & Sinha, Indu, 'State, Class and 'Sena' Nexus: Bathani Tola Massacre', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 31, No. 44 (Nov. 2, 1996), p. 2908
- ⁶² Ibid., 2908-2912
- ⁶² Bhatia, Bela, 'Massacre on the Banks of the Sone', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 32, No. 51 (Dec. 20-26, 1997), pp. 3242-3245
- ⁶² Louis, *Op cit.*, p. 2208
- ⁶² Louis, *Op cit.*, p. 2207

- ⁶²Human Rights Watch &SmitaNarula, *Broken People: Caste violence against India's "untouchables"* (New Delhi: Human Rights Watch,1999) p 48
- ⁶²Mathew, Mammen "Caste, Politics and the cycle of strife", <http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume2/Fault2-MatthewF.htm> Accessed on July 20, 2017
- ⁶² "The Pattern of Abuse: Rural Violence In Bihar And The State's Response" Human Rights Watch<https://www.hrw.org/reports/1999/india/India994-06.htm> Accessed on August 15, 2017
- ⁶²Kumar, Avinash, 'Fallacy of the State in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 47, No. 44 (NOVEMBER 3, 2012), p. 23
- ⁶²Kumar, Avinash, 'Illegitimacy of the state in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 44, No. 44 (OCTOBER 31-NOVEMBER 6, 2009), p. 8
- ⁶²Nicholas Jaoul, "Naxalism in Bihar: From Bullet to Ballot" in Laurent Gayer & Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), *Armed Militias of South Asia- Fundamentalists, Maoists and Separatists*(London: C.Hurst& Co., 2009) p 28
- ⁶²Arwal Massacre: A Government Conspiracy? Report of an Investigation, *Economic and Political Weekly*, May 31, 1986 <https://www.jstor.org/stable/4375729> Accessed on July 30, 2017
- ⁶²Kunnath, George J. "Rebels From the Mud Houses: Dalits and the Making of the Maoist Revolution- Dalits and the making of Maoist Revolution in Bihar" (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2012)p 174
- ⁶²Ramesh, op.cit. *India Today*
- ⁶²Enlightened Scheme, India Today <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/operation-siddhartha-is-no-blood-and-thunder-army-exercise-intended-to-destroy-a-terrorist-group/1/330195.html> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁶² Cited in Kunnath, George J. "Rebels From the Mud Houses: Dalits and the Making of the Maoist Revolution- Dalits and the making of Maoist Revolution in Bihar" (New Delhi: Social Science Press, 2012) p 174
- ⁶²Ibid., p 175
- ⁶²Ahmed, Saroor, 'Why is Jehanabad the centre of bloodbaths?', *Rediff*<http://www.rediff.com/news/1999/apr/26bihar.htm> Accessed on August 20, 2017
- ⁶² Ahmed, Farzand 'Panic Ban'*India Today* , <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/cm-bindeshwari-dubey-decision-to-ban-mkss-raises-doubts-about-his-grip-on-bihar/1/348808.html> Accessed on August 10, 2017
- ⁶²Enlightened Scheme, India Today <http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/operation-siddhartha-is-no-blood-and-thunder-army-exercise-intended-to-destroy-a-terrorist-group/1/330195.html> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁶² Ahmed, Farzand, 'Transfer Tremors'<http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/bihar-govt-transfers-ias-ips-officers-as-ruling-party-politicians-find-them-a-nuisance/1/348638.html> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁶² "Amir Das Commission disbanded", *Outlook*, <https://www.outlookindia.com/newswire/story/amir-das-commission-probing-politician-sena-nexus-disbanded/376576> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁶²Suroor, Hasaan, 'Partners in crime: How Bihar politicians hushed up a Dalit massacre'*First Post*,<http://www.firstpost.com/politics/partners-in-crime-how-bihar-politicians-hushed-up-a-dalit-massacre-2410222.html> Accessed on August 11, 2017
- ⁶²Cited in Notes Kumar, Avinash, 'Fallacy of the State in Bihar', *Economic and Political Weekly*, Vol. 47, No. 44 (NOVEMBER 3, 2012), p. 25
- ⁶²South Asia Solidarity Group Condemns the Burning Alive of Dalit Children in India, *South Asia Solidarity Group*, <http://www.southasiasolidarity.org/tag/dalit/page/4/> Accessed on August 21, 2017
- ⁶² Verma, Meena, 'Prior to the visit to the UK of the Indian PM Modi, Dalit organisations sent him an open letter', *Dalit Solidarity Network, UK*, November 18, 2015 <http://dsnuk.org/2015/11/18/prior-to-the-visit-to-the-uk-of-the-indian-pm-modi-dalit-organisations-sent-him-an-open-letter/> Accessed on August 1, 2017
- ⁶² Governing caste and Managing conflicts 1990-2011, *Mahanirban Calcutta Research Group* March, 2012, p 22<http://www.mcrg.ac.in/PP48.pdf> Accessed on August 25, 2017